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Abstract 
The paper studies the determinants of labor force participation by East German 
women after unification. To isolate the role of preferences on labor force participation 
from individual characteristics, we develop a panel data model that simultaneously 
explains participation, employment, and wages. The model, estimated for East and 
West Germany on the basis of the German Socio-Economic Panel, indicates that 
distinct preferences could explain the regional difference in participation rates at 
unification. Afterward East German women became less willing to participate, but the 
negative participation trend was offset on the aggregate level by changes in 
characteristics and wages promoting participation. 
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1. Introduction 
A peculiarity of the former German Democratic Republic, like of several of her former Eastern-
European partner states, was the high involvement of women in the labor force. Before the 
collapse of the communist system, more than 80% of women at working age participated in the 
labor market – a rate only comparable to the achievement of Scandinavian countries like 
Denmark and Sweden. In particular, it appears that women in the German Democratic Republic 
were better integrated into the labor market than women of the former German Federal Republic 
where participation rates were low by international standards. After the unification of the two 
German states, the share of women resident in the area of the former German Democratic 
Republic (henceforth referred to as East Germany) who participated in the labor market declined, 
but only gradually. In May 2000, 72% of all women at working age in East Germany were 
employed or, if not, in search of employment. Although at that time the female participation rate 
in East Germany was considerably low compared to the one before unification, it still exceeded 
the corresponding rate of 62% for women resident in the area of the former German Federal 
Republic (henceforth referred to as West Germany) substantially. 
The moderate decline in female labor force participation in East Germany is quite remarkable 
considering that women have been facing high levels of unemployment since the collapse of em-
ployment opportunities at the outset of unification. The economic transition following thereafter 
brought the employment rate among working age women to the West German level of 58%. One 
might expect that enduring low outflow from unemployment to employment would discourage 
unemployed women from seeking employment. Besides, public policies during the economic 
transition, like early retirement schemes and the adaptation of the Western tax and transfer sys-
tem, established incentives to withdraw from the labor market. 
On the other hand, the central planners of the former East German command economy, in 
response to capital shortages, promoted female emancipation in the labor market. It is possible 
that this policy affected attitudes toward participation in the labor market fundamentally. If this is 
true, the question arises if East German women will adapt their behavior to West German 
patterns. For by definition unemployment is the difference between labor force participation and 
employment, an answer to this question might help to better understand the nature of the 
unemployment problem in East Germany. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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So far, most analysts of the Eastern European labor markets in transition, like Svejnar (1999) in a 
prominent survey, have largely ignored the role of labor force participation and labor supply.
1 
The aim of this paper is to address this gap, and to study empirically the adjustment of labor force 
participation behavior formed in a centrally planned economy and exposed to a free market 
economy. Reunited Germany provides a unique opportunity for this analysis, as it allows 
comparing the participation decisions of East German women to those of West German women 
who have been living with the same economic institutions. 
For our analysis on the individual level, we will use regional samples of prime age non-single 
women, extracted from the 1990-1999 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel. In view of 
the fact that shortage of job opportunities has played an important role during economic 
transition, we develop an empirical model that explains the incidence of employment as the result 
of (1) the individual choice to participate in the labor market and (2) the employment 
opportunities of those individuals who decide to participate. Estimation of this model lets us 
isolate the impact of differences in individual preferences, and of differences in individual and 
family characteristics, on the differences in participation levels. 
On the basis of our empirical analysis we find that differences in preferences on participation 
largely explain the participation gap at the time of the unification. But afterward this factor has 
gradually become less important, which indicates that prime age East German women are indeed 
adjusting to the preference patterns of West German women. It turns out that, on the aggregate 
level, this process is partly offset by the individual characteristics of East German women, which 
have changed in a way favorable to participation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sketches the impact of German 
unification on the East German labor market and describes the development of female labor force 
participation since unification on the aggregate level. Section 3 formulates our empirical model to 
jointly analyze employment and labor force participation on the individual level. Section  4 
describes the data source – the German Socio-Economic Panel – and the sample that we extract. 
Section 5 discusses the estimation results and a variety of simulations providing a comparison 
between the behavior of East and West German women. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
1 A recent exception is Boeri (2001) who incorporates labor supply in a model for Optimal Speed of Transition. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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2. Labor Market Trends after Unification 
In this section, we describe some general trends of female labor force participation during the 
1990s on the aggregate level. We first sketch the impact of unification on the East German labor 
market and discuss how the economic transition has affected the position of women. Next, we use 
data from the German Micro Census (GMC) to portray the differences in female labor force 
participation rates between East and West Germany in more detail.
2 
The unification of the two German states, in July 1990, from one day to another established the 
economic system of West Germany in East Germany. As part of the shock therapy, all contracts 
including wage agreements were converted into West German Marks at parity. The real price 
blow revealed the inefficient allocation of labor in the under-capitalized East German economy at 
once. The result was a sharp recession with production losses of about 50%. In the process of pri-
vatizing state enterprises, employment contracted by about a third between 1990 and 1992. Since 
then the economy has recovered only very gradually.
3 
The recession hit employment among women harder than employment among men. By 1995, 
36% of all employed women had lost employment, compared to only 23% of all employed men. 
One explanation for this outcome is that in case of lay-offs employers decided to discriminate 
against women (Meyer, 1997). A further explanation for the unequal outcome is based on 
selection. Using the 1990-1996 waves of the German Socio Economic Panel, Hunt (1999, 2001a) 
reveals that in the first years after unification low wage earners had a relatively high 
unemployment risk. This was a disadvantage for women who, at an average, earned somewhat 
lower wages than men. In the process of reallocating labor via the transitory state of 
unemployment, women had also less chances to be re-employed. In the period from 1992 to 
1994, men took up net 90% of the new regular employment opportunities registered by the 
German Federal Labor Office (Gladisch and Trabert, 1995). 
As a consequence of high lay-off rates combined with low re-employment rates, unemployment 
among East German women expanded rapidly at the early stages of the economic transition. In 
the GMC of 1993, a maximum of 18% among East German women at working age without a job 
                                                 
2 The German Micro Census is an annual one percent rotary panel of the German population conducted by Statistics Germany. It is used to gather 
detailed information on socio-economic variables at the individual and household level, including records of labor market status (Statistics Ger-
many, various issues). The GMC was first conducted in East Germany in April 1991. 
3 Cf. Lange and Pugh (1998) and Bonin and Zimmermann (2001) for surveys of the economic trends in East Germany since unification. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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declared seeking employment. Since then the East German economy has recovered somewhat, 
but the unemployment problem remains severe. In May 2000, 14.5% of women at age 15-64 were 
in search of employment, more than ten percentage points above the West German rate of 4.4%. 
At that time, the difference in male unemployment rates between East and West Germany was 
only 7.3 percentage points. 
Nevertheless, the job prospects of East German women were perhaps not as bad as the customary 
focus on unemployment figures suggests. In contrast to experiences in other countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe studied by Boeri et al. (1998), it seems that in East Germany the reduction of 
the employment-population ratio was mild. In fact during the last decade the employment rate of 
East German women, despite a sharp decline in the aftermath of unification, mostly ranged above 
the Western level. From this perspective, it might look as if the permanence of high labor force 
participation would contribute to explaining the lasting unemployment problem of East German 
women. 
An expectation among analysts (and policy makers) at the time of unification was perhaps that 
female labor force participation in the East would follow West German patterns soon. In fact, 
several arguments in favor of lower female participation rates in the post-communist labor market 
can be made. First of all, if the former full-employment policy put some pressure on East German 
women to work, they could now decide to withdraw from the labor market voluntarily, in favor of 
household production or leisure. Second, incentives that should drive women into employment 
ceased to exist with the unification. An important example is the reduction of childcare facilities, 
which forced women with dependent children to leave work at least in some Central and Eastern 
European countries (Chase, 1995). 
At the same time, the extension of the West German economic system to East Germany 
introduced several labor supply disincentives. An example is the entitlement to long parental 
leave, which spurs detachment of mothers from the labor market (Gustafsson  et al., 1996). 
Another example is the installation of Western income tax law in East Germany. The principle of 
full income splitting locks women in a family trap, as it imposes high marginal tax rates on 
second-earner wages. For West Germany, the negative impact on labor supply of married women 
is a well-established fact (Spahn et al., 1994; Strøm and Wagenhals, 1991). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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In view of the many labor supply disincentives, and the discouraging experience of constantly 
high unemployment, the share of East German women remaining in the labor market has been 
remarkably stable. This is evident from Figure 1, which shows the development by region of 
labor force participation rates, as contained in the GMC, for four different female cohorts who 
were at working age throughout the observation period.
4 In East Germany, the labor force 
participation rates of prime-age (25-44) women fall steadily, but stay at levels above 90%. 
Despite growing participation of prime-age women in the West (partly following cohort aging as 
Western mothers re-enter the labor force once their dependent children are old enough) the 
regional gap in the participation rates gets smaller only very gradually. It is still larger than 15 
percentage points in 1999. 
Also at the extremes of the age distribution, the participation rates of Eastern women do not 
adjust to Western levels. Interpreting the development of employment rates for the youngest and 
oldest generations (of age 15-24 and 45-55, respectively, at the time of the unification) one has to 
keep in mind that they are affected by the life-cycle: The participation levels of the youngest 
women increase as they gradually complete education, while the employment levels of the oldest 
women decrease as they gradually retire. For the oldest generation of East German women, the 
rates of participation in the labor market fall drastically over the observation period. Temporary 
early retirement schemes launched specifically to alleviate labor market pressure in the East are 
important for this development (Koller 1999). Considering the strong negative supply incentives 
introduced with these programs, and the bad employment prospects of older labor market 
participants, it is quite remarkable that the labor force participation rate of East German women 
in this generation continues to exceed that of West German women by around ten percentage 
points. 
Perhaps labor supply within the youngest cohort of East German women is elevated at first by 
some peculiar attitudes toward education. As was shown by Dietrich (1999) on the basis of the 
European Labor Force Survey, East Germans continue to prefer vocational and apprenticeship 
training rather than attending university and therefore participate on the labor market earlier. But 
this cannot explain why the participation rate for this group exceed the Western level constantly 
                                                 
4 The definition of the labor force of Statistics Germany, used for the GMC, includes all agents who have a work contract, including military per-
sonnel and apprentices, unpaid family workers, the self-employed, farmers and agents exercising a liberal profession. Besides, agents who claim to 
be in search of employment are considered as participating, and might be categorized as being involuntary unemployed. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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by about one fifth. This observation suggests that if anything, the labor supply of the youngest 
cohort will converge to that of prime age East German women, but not to that of the West 
German women of their own generation. 
Giving little indication that female labor supply in East Germany would adjust to the new 
economic environment, Figure 1 poses an important question to answer if one wishes to fully 
understand the incidence of unemployment during the transition in the East: Why does the labor 
force participation rate of East German women rest at such a high level? Two hypotheses are 
worth our attention. The first and most obvious proposition is that the communist full 
employment policy shifted labor supply preferences of women permanently toward participation. 
The behavioral pattern might be strong enough to overcome the disincentives introduced with 
unification, and might even be carried over to young East-German generations. The second 
proposition is, however, that the differences in labor supply between East and West German 
women are largely the result of different individual and family characteristics, and wages, rather 
than the result of different preferences. 
Some stylized facts may help to make the relevance of the second explanation conceivable. First, 
the fertility rate in East Germany dropped drastically immediately after unification, as a 
consequence of women postponing proliferation to a later age (Lechner, 1998). Therefore the 
employment disincentives of childcare facilities lacking might be less important in the East, an 
effect which is in line with the results presented by Hunt (1999). Second, a rather even 
distribution of wage earnings among husbands and wives, at least compared to West German 
couples, reduces the disincentives effected by the German income tax system. At the same time, 
women could not withdraw from the labor market without reducing the standard of living for 
their family substantially. 
The relative importance of these rival explanations for persistent disparities of female labor force 
participation between East and West Germany is a question that can best be answered by an 
empirical investigation that accounts for individual and family characteristics together with 
wages. For this reason the next section formulates an empirical model for the labor force 
participation and employment opportunities of women on the individual level. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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3. Empirical Model 
In this section we develop an empirical model to explain the incidence of labor force participation 
and employment. The underlying idea of the model will be that an individual has to take two 
hurdles to be employed: (1) she has to decide to participate in the labor market, and (2) she needs 
to have an employment opportunity. As the wage is a determinant of labor supply, and potentially 
also of labor demand, we extend the model to simultaneously explain wages. An important 
characteristic of our analysis is that we allow for gradual changes over time in the structure of 
labor supply preferences, employment opportunities, and wages. 
Our model is a variation of the so-called double hurdle models of Cragg (1971) and Poirier 
(1980). It can also be viewed as an extension of the classical sample selection model of Heckman 
(1979). An example of a model similar to ours is Blundell et al. (1987) who estimates a joint 
model for labor supply, employment opportunities, and wages on the basis of the 1981 UK 
Family Expenditure Survey. Hujer and Grammig (1995) estimate another similar model on the 
basis of panel data extracted from the West German sample of the German Socio-Economic 
Panel and from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
A minor deviation from these references is that they consider labor supply in the form of working 
hours, where we study labor supply as a participation decision. A more substantial deviation from 
the references is related to the fact that they do not observably distinguish between voluntary and 
involuntary unemployment, but incorporate the two labor market states within the model on the 
basis of certain identifying assumptions. As a consequence, the predicted incidence of individual 
unemployment and non-participation might not match the corresponding trends on the macro 
level. As the latter are at the core of our interest, we decide to use an alternative approach, 
assuming that the different labor market states are directly observable. In order to distinguish 
between voluntary and involuntary unemployment, we will rely on survey data concerning 
involuntary unemployment. 
To build our empirical model we first consider the participation decision. A woman will 
participate in the labor market if her market wage is larger than her reservation wage. We will 
treat this in reduced form similar to Gronau (1974). Define Pit
* as a latent variable for labor force 
participation, and define Pit as the observed outcome on labor force participation, both for woman 
i at time t. Define X
P
it as a vector of individual labor supply characteristics, and define wit
* as the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
 
 
 
8
logarithm of the gross market wage of woman i at time t. Then we formulate the participation 
hurdle to employment as follows: 
(1)  Pit
* = X
P
it βt
P + wit
* γt
P
 + ε
P
i + ε
P
it      
  Pit
  =   1  if  Pit
* >  0     (does  participate) 
     0  if  Pit
* ≤  0     (does  not  participate) 
with βt
P a vector of parameters, γt
P a parameter, and ε
P
i and ε
P
it an individual specific and a 
remainder error term, respectively. 
A non-standard feature of our model is that it allows the parameters to depend on time. The 
underlying idea is to incorporate behavioral changes, which we expect to observe especially for 
East German women who need to adjust to a new economic and social environment. The most 
general option would be to allow for different parameters in each year, but this might lead to 
sequences of parameters difficult to interpret. Instead, we restrict the variation of the parameters 
to a cubic time pattern. More specifically, we assume that 
(2)  βt
P = β0
P + β1
P t + β2
P t²     ;     γt
P = γ0
P + γ1
P t + γ2
P t²   , 
where t measures time since German unification. 
To describe the second hurdle to employment, we assume that a woman who is willing to 
participate in the labor market will be observed in employment if she has an employment 
opportunity. Parallel to Blundell et al. (1987), the employment opportunity equation should be 
interpreted as being a reduced form: It does not represent explicitly a lay-off rate or job arrival 
rate. Define Eit
* as a latent variable for having an employment opportunity, and define Eit as the 
observed outcome on having an employment opportunity for woman i at time t. Next define X
E
it 
as a vector of characteristics impacting on employment. Then we describe the employment hurdle 
by: 
 (3)  Eit
* = X
E
it βt
E + γt
E wit
* + ε
E
i + ε
E
it 
  Eit
  =   1  if  Eit
* >  0     (has  employment  opportunity) 
  0  if  Eit
* ≤ 0        (has no employment opportunity) 
with βt
E a vector of parameters, γt
E a parameter, and ε
E
i and ε
E
it an individual specific and a 
remainder error term, respectively. As the earnings capacity of an individual is generally related William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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to her labor market prospects, we allow the market wage wit
* of woman i at time t to have a direct 
impact on the probability of having an employment opportunity. Parallel to the participation 
hurdle, parameters are permitted to vary along a cubic pattern to design the changing employment 
conditions faced in particular by East German women. 
To complete the model, we note that the market wage wit
* is measured only for women who take 
the two hurdles. Thus we need to model wages simultaneously. Define Zit as a vector of 
individual wage characteristics. Then we formulate the wage equation as follows:  
(4)  wit
* = Z it δt + νi + νit    
  wit
  =   wit
*    if  Pi
* > 0 and Ei
* >  0    (wage  observed) 
  missing  if  Pi
* ≤ 0  or  Ei
* ≤ 0      (wage not observed) 
with δt a vector of parameters, again treated as time-variant, and νi and νit an individual specific 
and a remainder error term, respectively. 
To summarize, we distinguish three labor market outcomes: 
1.  Employment:          (Pit = 1, Eit = 1, wit = wit
*) 
2.  Involuntary unemployment:        (Pit = 1, Eit = 0, wit =  . ) 
3.  Voluntary unemployment:         (Pit = 0, Eit =  . , wit =  . ) 
The probability that a woman is observed as being employed is given by the probability that she 
participates and at the same time has an employment opportunity (Pit = 1, Eit = 1). Only in this 
case we observe her market wage. A woman might also be unemployed involuntarily. The 
probability of this outcome is given by the probability that she participates combined with the 
probability that she does not have an employment opportunity (Pit = 1, Eit = 0). Finally, a woman 
can be unemployed voluntarily. The probability of this outcome is given by the probability that 
she decides against labor market participation (Pit = 0). 
A potential problem of the approach is misspecification due to misclassification. On the one 
hand, some of the non-participants might be discouraged workers, while on the other hand some 
of the involuntary unemployed might only register as being unemployed to retain certain rights 
on welfare and other social benefits. To our knowledge, only one recent study has taken such 
considerations into account; Blundell et al. (1998) allow for discouraged workers by exploiting William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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data on involuntary unemployment in the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey. We will not allow for 
misclassification, as it would be cumbersome to integrate in our model. 
A crucial issue of our empirical model is identification, which is somewhat different from the 
standard double hurdle models referred to at the beginning of this Section. Appendix A describes 
the exclusion restrictions we need to impose. In particular, we require at least one exogenous 
variable specific to the participation equation, and one specific to the employment opportunity 
equation. Hence, in the empirical section, we assume that certain individual and family character-
istics affect participation only, and that certain regional labor market characteristics affect em-
ployment opportunities only. In this, we follow a tradition in the labor supply literature, where 
identification without assumptions on exclusion restrictions is difficult. 
Combining the probabilities for the three possible labor market outcomes yields the likelihood for 
women i at time t:  
(5)  Λit = Π1 P(Pit = 1, Eit = 1 | wit ) f(wit)  Π2 P(Pit = 1, Eit = 0) Π3 P(Pit = 0) 
To estimate this discrete choice panel data model, we will choose a random effects model 
specification. The details of our estimation strategy are discussed in Appendix B. 
4. Data 
The data we use for our empirical analysis is taken from the 1990-1999 waves of the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
5 The GSOEP contains a separate panel of households who 
were resident in East Germany shortly before the unification (the so-called sample C). We will 
categorize the members of this sample as East Germans even if they moved to live in West 
Germany during the observation period, or commuted to be employed in West Germany. In the 
same fashion, the sample of West Germans is composed of households who initially lived in the 
German Federal Republic (the so-called sample A).
6  
For both regions we select a sample of women with a labor market record that allows us to 
determine their labor market status. Due to limitations of the GSOEP, the concepts of labor 
market status that we use from now on are somewhat different from the official definitions of 
                                                 
5 See Burkhauser et al. (1997) for a general introduction to the GSOEP. 
6 The samples do not include households with a foreign head. For a regional comparison the under-sampling of foreigners is an advantage: We 
expect foreigners to exhibit a different labor supply behavior, while the share of foreigners is lower in East than in West Germany. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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employment and labor force participation underlying the figures previously reported. More 
specifically, we will count individuals observed with positive working hours as employed. This is 
not very different from the official concept, which is also not limited to dependent employment. 
Labor force participation, by definition, comprises employment and involuntary unemployment. 
On the basis of the GSOEP, we can define involuntary unemployment only as being registered 
unemployed. This means a clear deviation from the official concept of labor force participation 
based on individual job search. 
For several reasons we limit the analysis to women who were between 25-44 years old at the time 
of unification. First, our empirical model is not very well designed to study older agents who 
have an outside option of early retirement. As was discussed above, early retirement policies had 
a strong impact on the employment and participation rates in East Germany, but work 
disincentives stemming from the design of Social Security are also influential in West Germany 
(Börsch-Supan and Schmidt, 2001). Regarding the youngest generation who entered the labor 
market only after unification, we believe that region specific selection into and out of education 
would be an important issue biasing the parameters of our model. 
Concerning the two middle-aged cohorts, analyzed separately above, we lump them together in 
order to increase sample sizes. It is evident from Figure 1 that the labor force participation 
patterns of these cohorts are quite similar so that it makes good sense to study them jointly. The 
employment and labor force participation rates derived from the GSOEP and the GMC match 
remarkably well. For the West German sample, the differences between the two data sources are 
never statistically significant. For the East German sample, aggregate employment rates are not 
significantly different except for 1991, but throughout the observation period labor force 
participation rates according to the GSOEP are significantly smaller. This suggests that in East 
Germany the number of women who are registered unemployed could be smaller than the number 
of women who are in search of employment. Still the trends in aggregate labor force participation 
indicated by the GSOEP and the GMC are clearly parallel. Hence we believe that using 
information on registered unemployment is a reasonable alternative to using data on search 
behavior, so that the GSOEP is suitable for our purposes. 
For the empirical analysis, we reduce the two samples to include married and cohabiting women 
only. The reason to focus on women who have a partner is that the labor supply behavior of 
single women is rather similar by region. Also in West Germany, women who are single William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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normally stay closely attached to the labor market. A straightforward decomposition of the regional labor 
force participation gap, into the parts explained by single women, by married or cohabiting women, and 
by differences in marriage or cohabiting rates, allows us to quantify this argument:
7 Almost 90% of the 
participation gap found for prime age women in the GSOEP is attributable to the different labor market 
attachment of married or cohabiting women in East and West Germany. Only the remainder is 
attributable to single women, as the explanatory power of differences in marriage or cohabiting rates is 
about zero.  
After removing women with missing values, we are left with 750 to 900 observations per year of West 
German women, and with 540 to 770 observations per year of East German women. Table 1 displays 
the sample statistics for the variables of interest. Concerning labor market status, our samples clearly 
capture the weakly increasing participation and employment trends in West Germany, whereas the 
employment levels of the East German women, after the initial sharp decline, are stable and above those 
in the West. Participation quotas of East German women are somewhat decreasing, but remain high. 
The substantial disparities in wages and family characteristics between East and West German women 
that emerge from Table 1 might help to explain the different regional participation patterns. Under 
communism, East German women typically gave birth to children at a young age. Total fertility was 
higher than in the West, but dropped substantially with the unification. The consequences of this are 
reflected in Table 1: Prime-age East German women, relative to the West, have more dependent 
children at school age. At the same time, the average number of children at pre-school age, especially of 
children born after unification (age 0-2), is much lower in the East. Thus, if lack of childcare facilities for 
children not yet at school were a disincentive for mothers to work, we would expect East German 
women to participate in the labor market more frequently by comparison. 
Another fact that is derived from Table 1 is substantial regional disparity in real wages, which we 
calculate in hourly terms on the basis of gross earnings in the month prior to the interview, in combination 
                                                 
7 Define LFPR as the labor force participation rate in region R (east versus west), LFP
X
R as the labor force participation rate in region R 
and marriage and cohabiting status X (single versus married or cohabiting), and MR as the marriage and cohabiting rate in region R. Then 
it is possible to disentangle the regional difference in the labor force participation rates in the following way: 
4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 1 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 2 1 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 1
Rate Marriage
M
E
S
E E W
Women Single
S
W
S
E W
Women Married
M
W
M
E W W E LFP LFP M M LFP LFP M LFP LFP M LFP LFP ) )( ( ) )( 1 ( ) ( - - + - - + - = -  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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with the standard working hours of an individual. Despite the possibility of noise in the variable on hours, 
we prefer the hourly wage to the monthly wage, to account for the fact that there are sizeable regional 
differences in average working hours. We deflate wages according to area of residency, and establish 
equal purchasing power by relying on Grunert (2000) who finds that in 1998 price levels were 10% 
lower in the East than in the West, to correct nominal values for East Germany. 
As expected, real wages of East German women, at the time of unification, were substantially lower than 
real wages of West German women. But those who stayed employed experienced substantial wage 
growth afterwards. Although convergence of wages has slowed down since 1995, the regional gap in 
female hourly wages, in our samples, has become less than 10% in recent years. In contrast, the real 
wages of partners in East Germany are still much lower than those of their Western countrymen, lagging 
behind by roughly one third. Since unemployment benefits are paid in proportion to previous income in 
Germany, also the average amount of benefits received by a partner who is unemployed is substantially 
smaller in the East. 
These observations could provide an explanation for the high participation rates of married wives. East 
German women might not have the possibility to withdraw from the labor market, since their earnings are 
needed to guarantee a certain standard of living for the family. In this regard, it is perhaps revealing that 
the elevated employment rates of East German wives just compensate the (judged by West German 
standard) high incidence of unemployment among their husbands. At least, while on average 1.57 
members of a West German couple were employed in 1999, this figure was 1.58 in East Germany. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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5. Empirical Results 
This section presents the estimation results for the model developed in Section 3, based on the 
regional samples of married and cohabiting women discussed in Section 4. We will first discuss 
the results for East German women, then for West German women, and finally we present 
simulations illustrating the importance of preferences and of individual characteristics for the 
different labor market attachment of East and West German women. The estimation results 
presented in this section are the result of a trade off between efficiency (in terms of the variances) 
and flexibility of the model. As the empirical model has a large number of parameters, especially 
due to the interactions with time since unification, we eliminate many insignificant variables.  
East German Sample 
Table 2 shows the estimation results for the participation and the employment opportunity 
equations in the East German sample of prime-aged women, together with the outcome of the 
supporting wage equation. The estimation results for the latter are in harmony with what is 
known about the development of Eastern post-unification wages, described, for example, by 
Franz and Steiner (2000). In particular, the coefficients of the year dummies indicate both the 
large wage increase at the initial stage of the economic transition, consequent to a policy of equal 
pay established through collective bargains, and the moderation of wage growth when the 
transformation crisis became perceived as being permanent. Our estimation results even indicate 
that wage growth, in real terms, came to an end after 1995. 
Within our analysis the wage equation is of auxiliary interest. We need it to predict the wages of 
the non-employed. For this reason we keep the impact of education levels flexible by interacting 
them with age. We decide to avoid standard explanatory variables like tenure or experience. In 
view of high employment under communism, the large disparity in tenure and experience of East 
and West German women would make a regional comparison difficult. Although the coefficients 
on education are mostly insignificant (in part due to the interaction with age), they turn out to be 
broadly consistent with estimates based on the GSOEP provided by Hunt (2001b). Taking into 
account the interactions with age, the estimated coefficients suggest that relative to 
apprenticeship, which is the omitted category, vocational training and university education are 
more highly rewarded. The interaction of the education levels with time since unification also 
replicates the result by Hunt that wages in the highest skill group were rising relatively faster as William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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the economic transformation progressed. Finally, the results exhibit the expected decreasing 
returns to age. 
The medium column of Table 2 summarizes the results for the employment opportunity equation. 
The derived latent market wage has a significant positive impact on the chances of having an 
employment opportunity, which is in line with the hypothesis that women with a higher earnings 
capacity have a better chance to be employed. Furthermore the impact of wages increased over 
time. This finding is in line with earlier results on the employment and unemployment durations 
of East German women based on the GSOEP, reported by Hunt (1999). Furthermore in East 
Germany, age does not appear to have an impact on the individual employment opportunity 
probability, at least not in our medium age range. 
Besides personal characteristics, also the tightness of the regional labor market has an impact on 
the employment opportunity probability. In general this natural connection is difficult to confirm, 
but we observe that the local unemployment level, as reported by the Labor Offices, has indeed a 
negative impact on the employment opportunity probability for East German women. The 
regional vacancy rate, on the other hand, exerts no separate influence. Judged by the coefficient 
on the time dummies, the employment opportunity probabilities faced by East German women 
declined significantly over time, which is consistent with the emergence of high unemployment 
rates in the East. 
We now come to the results for individual labor market participation at the core of our interest. 
According to the first column of Table 2, particularly two factors are relevant for the participation 
decision of the East German women. First, as one would expect, participation varies inversely 
with the number of young children present in the household. But the disincentive effect of 
children seems to disappear once children reach school age. The negative sign of the interaction 
between the number of children aged 3-5 and the time since unification implies that the 
disincentive effect increased over time. An appealing explanation is that this is due to the decline 
of childcare facilities in the East, as this could have forced women to withdraw from the labor 
market. 
Second, the own wage capacity has a highly significant positive impact on participation. This is 
obviously in line with the economic theory on reservation wages. The interaction of wage and 
time since unification is excluded from the model, as it is insignificant. The income of the partner William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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present in the household has no significant impact on female participation. This is true whether 
the partner is employed (and receives a positive hourly wage) or unemployed (and receives a 
positive monthly benefit). One interpretation of this is that East German women decide about 
labor force participation independently. 
The results for the East German sample provide no simple evidence that women would reduce 
participation to the lower Western levels. At least there is no independent negative time trend in 
the probability of labor force participation. However, interacted with age and the number of 
children, time since unification is significantly different from zero. This suggests that at least 
certain behavioral changes affected participation rates during the observational period. 
Table 3 reports the estimated variances and covariances of the participation and employment 
opportunity equations, and of the supporting wage equation. The results for the East German 
sample are on display in the upper part. We find evidence for an individual specific effect in the 
employment opportunity probability as well as in the participation probability. But the 
correlations between the errors terms of the two equations are not significant, which suggests 
there are no unobserved individual characteristics affecting both outcomes. Other correlations are 
not identified, as is explained in Appendix A. 
West German Sample 
The estimation results for the West German women are presented in Table  4. The wage 
regression in the last column captures the period of moderate real wage growth that sets West 
Germany apart from what was experienced in East Germany after unification. Most of the 
variables on education are insignificant, which is the result of including interaction terms with 
age. We maintain them in the empirical model nevertheless, to keep the estimation results for the 
East and West German women comparable. 
In the employment opportunity equation, in contrast to the results for East German women, the 
wage and time effects do not have explanatory power. Also the macro measures for labor market 
tightness are insignificant. This somewhat implausible finding contrasts the empirical evidence 
on employment chances of West German women provided by Hujer and Grammig (1995) whose 
analysis is founded on regionally more disaggregated data, however. 
The estimation results on female labor force participation derived from the Western sample 
reveal important differences in comparison to the Eastern sample. Regarding the number of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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dependents, for West German women also children at school age seem to create a disincentive to 
participate. This is in line with the fact that Western women, at least in the cohort under study, 
after childbirth still often withdraw from the labor market permanently. Further, while the chance 
to be in the labor market is naturally positively related to their own wage, it appears that for West 
German women the participation decision interacts also with the income of their partner. His 
wage if employed, or, alternatively, the level of his benefit, relates negatively to the female 
participation rate. This result fits the observation that many married women in West Germany are 
second earners. 
The lower part of Table 3 reports the estimated variances and covariances of the model for the 
West German sample. There is evidence for an individual specific effect in the participation 
probability, but not in the employment opportunity probability. The covariances of the 
participation and employment opportunity equations are again insignificant. Thus there is no 
evidence that unobserved characteristics of West German women have an impact on both labor 
market outcomes. 
Simulations 
The magnitude of the disparities in behavior between East and West German women is difficult 
to judge by simply comparing the estimated parameters. First, the reported estimates do not 
measure marginal effects. Moreover, the models we estimate on the basis of the East and West 
German samples do not contain exactly the same set of variables, since our model for West 
German women excludes most of the time effects that we consider relevant for East German 
women in view of the economic transition process. Therefore we rely on simulations to bring out 
the effects of the estimated parameters on labor force participation. For a reference, we apply the 
estimated parameter for our samples of East and West German women to their observed 
characteristics. Figure 2 shows that the outcome of the basis simulation is similar to the actual 
pattern of female participation rates on the aggregate level. This suggests that at least our 
empirical model satisfactorily replicates the data. 
In a first experiment, actually not included in Figure 2, we eliminate the impact of the time 
passed since unification on the labor force participation rates. Without time effects, compared to 
the basis simulation, the participation rate of East German women increases over time, reaching a 
level close to full participation by the end of the decade. This result shows that actually there William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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exists an independent time trend impacting negatively on participation in the East. The fact that 
the participation rates observed in East Germany were stable after unification despite the negative 
time trend shows that other developments influenced labor supply positively. The major positive 
factor appears to be the large real wage increase for women. Choosing leisure (or home 
production) has become more expensive, and therefore less attractive. Note that the impact of 
increasing wages in the participation equation is not offset by an interaction between wages and 
time since unification, as this interaction is completely insignificant and therefore eliminated 
from the estimated model. 
Next, we analyze what part of the participation gap between East and West German women is 
caused by regional differences in individual labor supply preferences (as indicated by the 
estimated parameters of the participation equation), and what part is explained by differences in 
individual characteristics observed in our samples. We run two counterfactual experiments: (1) a 
preference simulation, which applies the behavioral parameters estimated on the basis of the 
Western (Eastern) sample to the individual characteristics of East German (West German) 
women, and (2) a characteristics simulation, which applies the individual characteristics of West 
German (East German) women to the behavioral parameters estimated on the basis of the Eastern 
(Western) sample.
8 
For East German women, the preference simulation generates much lower participation rates. We 
observe that if East German women had adapted their labor supply preferences to those prevalent 
among West German women, the regional participation gap had largely vanished at least for the 
first years after unification. This implies that mostly differences in preferences, and not 
differences in individual characteristics, bring about the distinct participation patterns on the 
Eastern and Western labor markets. However, it turns out that the influence of specific Eastern 
labor supply preferences is in decline. In the East German chart of Figure 2, the labor force 
participation gap predicted by the East German and the West German parameters, respectively, 
clearly becomes smaller over time. 
On the other hand, the characteristics simulation reveals that emerging regional disparities in 
individual characteristics are widening the participation gap between East and West Germany. At 
                                                 
8 In the characteristics simulation, we change all individual variables with the exception of the derived latent wage. Incorporating the wage gap 
between East and West German women blurs the effects of regional disparity in characteristics that we seek to isolate. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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the time of unification, given the labor supply preferences of East German women, exchanging 
individual characteristics by region would have hardly affected the level of labor force 
participation. Over the years, however, we observe that East German women participate less 
frequently, if we endow them with Western characteristics. The main factor explaining this result 
is that prime age East German women now have much fewer small children by comparison.  
The results of the preference and characteristics simulations for the West German women are on 
display in the second chart of Figure 2. The results and interpretations are parallel: It turns out 
that specific regional attitudes to labor supply, which could fully explain the differences in 
participation rates between East and West Germany, have become less important during the 
1990s. At the same time, the individual characteristics of East German women have changed in a 
way favorable to labor supply. This process partly offsets the impact of adjusting labor supply 
behavior, and prevents more rapid convergence of the regional participation patterns. 
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this paper was to analyze the determinants of preferences on labor force participation 
by East German women after German unification. As the establishment of the West German 
economic system in East Germany among other things raised marginal tax rates on second earner 
incomes and reduced childcare facilities, the persistence of high female participation rates is a 
somewhat unexpected fact. A natural explanation would be that simply being exposed to a free 
market economy did not change the preferences of East German women formed under 
communism. But the leap of real wages, and the changing individual and family characteristics of 
East German women after the unification might provide a different explanation. 
To disentangle the impact of preferences from that of changing individual characteristics, and 
wages, we developed an empirical model that simultaneously explains individual labor force 
participation, employment opportunities and wages. For the estimation of the model, East and 
West German samples of prime-aged married (or cohabiting) women were taken from the 1991-
1999 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel. 
The estimated parameters indicate that the specific preferences on labor force participation of 
East German women could indeed explain the substantial difference in female participation rates 
between East and West Germany observed at the time of the unification. Afterwards, however, 
the behavior of East German women has changed in the sense that older women and women with William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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children at pre-school age have become less willing to participate. The reason why the significant 
change in individual preferences on participation is not observed on the aggregate level is that it 
is partly offset by individual characteristics that have changed in a way favorable to participation. 
In particular, a reduced number of small children in the consequence of fertility decline, and also 
the increased real wages available to East German women who manage to stay employed, pro-
moted female participation after unification. 
The reunification of Germany can be viewed as a unique experiment, as in no other country 
economic transition could be implemented so immediately and radically as in East Germany. The 
data generated by this process provide us with the exceptional opportunity to study behavioral 
adjustment after the exposure to a free market system. In this paper, we had to limit the analysis 
to preferences on labor force participation within a certain age group, but it is easy to come up 
with extensions for future research. 
As the participation decision captures only one aspect of labor supply behavior, an obvious issue 
to study next would be the decision on working hours. It is not only a fact that labor force 
participation of East German women continues to be high, but also that East German women who 
are employed continue to work, on average, substantially more hours than West German women. 
Another issue of interest would be the labor supply of East German cohorts entering the labor 
market only after unification. The participation rates of younger East German women observed so 
far seem to suggest that their participation rates will not develop parallel to that of West German 
women in their generation. Does this mean that labor supply behavior of East Germans will 
permanently stay different? To answer the question adequately, one will have to wait until the 
behavior of younger generations gets fully exposed to the labor market. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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Appendix A: Identification 
Due to the fact that the model of Section 3 deviates from the classical sample selection model, 
identification is not straightforward. This appendix discusses the assumptions we make to 
identify and estimate the model. Our first postulate is: 
(A.1)  The vectors of individual specific error terms (ε
P
i,ε
E
i,νi) and the remainder error terms 
(ε
P
it,ε
E
it,νit) are i.i.d. multivariate normally distributed. 
This assumption implies that we take a random effects approach, which means that we assume 
the individual effects to be uncorrelated with the exogenous variables. An alternative would be to 
suppose fixed effects. However, this approach is difficult to apply for the given system of 
equations, and is therefore beyond the scope of this study. 
Strictly speaking, our model would be identified on the basis of the normality assumption only. 
But we consider identification on the basis of distributional assumptions only not to be very 
satisfactory. Therefore, we choose to impose exclusion restrictions: 
(A.2)  There will be at least one exogenous variable specific to the participation equation, and 
one to the job-offer equation. 
The fact that we observe whether a woman is voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed does not 
mean that we only need one exclusion restriction. To see this impose two simplifications that do 
not affect identification: ignore the panel aspect of the data, and transform the model into a 
reduced form model by imposing γ
P=0 and γ
E=0. Now define σνP=cov(ε
P
i,νi) and σνE=cov(ε
E
i,νi). 
Then the expected wage of the employed is given by 
(A.3) E(wi | Pi=1,Ei=1) =  Z iδ + E(νi | Pi=1,Ei=1) 
    =   Z iδ + σνP MPE(X
P
i β
P, X
E
i β
E) + σνE MEP(X
P
i β
P, X
E
i β
E)  , 
where MPE and MEP are defined parallel to Maddala (1983, Section 9.6). 
The first point to note is that one exclusion restriction is sufficient to guarantee that the tuple 
(MPE, MEP) and Zi are not multi-collinear. Furthermore, the event MPE = MEP has probability zero. 
This implies that in a two-step estimation procedure, where the parameters (β
P, β
E) are estimated 
in the first round, the parameters (σνP, σνE) would be identified in the second round. But in this 
two-step estimation procedure the identification of the parameters (β
P, β
E) is not straightforward, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
 
 
 
22
as the outcome on the employment opportunity is observed only conditional on participation. 
This introduces another sample selection problem, and proper identification of the employment 
opportunity parameters requires an exogenous variable that is excluded from the employment 
opportunity equation, and that is specific to the participation equation. 
To conclude the argument, note the possibility that the error terms of the participation and the 
employment opportunity equation (ε
P
i, ε
E
i) are uncorrelated. This would imply 
(A.4) MPE(X
P
i β
P, X
E
i β
E) = λ(X
P
i β
P)     ;     MEP(X
P
i β
P, X
E
i β
E)= λ(X
E
i β
E)   , 
with λ(.) being the classical Heckman’s sample selection term, which is the inverse Mill’s ratio. 
So to guarantee identification in equation (A.3), separate exclusion restrictions are necessary for 
the participation and the employment opportunity equation. 
A last issue concerns the identification of the covariances. In the classical sample selection 
model, the participation equation does not contain the wage itself. Since both the wage and the 
participation equation will contain unobserved variables impacting on wages, one would 
generally expect that the error terms to be correlated. In our structural model incorporating the 
wage in the participation and the employment opportunity equation, this correlation is fully 
exhausted by the identification of the wage parameters (γ
P, γ
E). As a consequence, any additional 
parameters in the form of covariances between the error terms of the wage equation (νi, νit) 
cannot be identified. We hence make the assumption that 
(A.5) Cov(ε
A
i,νi)=0    ;    Cov(ε
A
it,νit)=0   for A=P,E   . William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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Appendix B: Estimation Procedure 
The estimation strategy we use in this paper is simulated maximum likelihood. The likelihood 
contribution of an employed woman i at time t takes the following form: 
(B.1)  Λit   = P(Pit=1,Eit=1 | wit ) f(wit) 
  =   P ( P it
*
 >0, Eit
*
 >0 | wit ) f(wit) 
  = ∫∫∫ P(ε
P
it >., ε
E
it >. | ε
P
i, ε
E
i, νi ) p(νit=. | νi ) p(ε
P
i, ε
E
i, νi) dε
P
i dε
E
i dνi 
To avoid more dimensional numerical integration, we approximate the integral by a simulated 
mean: For each individual we take R drawings from the distribution of the error-terms, and 
compute the average of the R likelihood values conditional on the drawn errors. Provided that R 
converges to infinity with the number of observations fast enough, this method is asymptotically 
equivalent to exact maximum likelihood. See, for example, Gourieroux and Montfort (1993). The 
simulated form of this part of the likelihood is 
(B.2)  Λit
s =  (1/R)  ∑r=1,..,R P(ε
P
it >., ε
E
it >. | ε
P
ir, ε
E
ir, νir ) p(νit=. | νir )   . 
The error terms (ε
P
ir, ε
E
ir, νir) of the simulated likelihood are random draws from the multivariate 
normal distribution. 
The likelihood contribution of a woman i involuntary unemployed at time t is given by: 
(B.3)  Λit   = P(Pit=1,Eit=0 ) 
  =   ∫∫∫ P(ε
P
it  - γ
Pνit>., ε
E
it - γ
Eνit <. | ε
P
i, ε
E
i, νi) p(ε
P
i, ε
E
i, νi) dε
P
i dε
E
i dνi 
  =   ∫∫∫∫ P(ε
P
it >., ε
E
it<. | ε
P
i, ε
E
i, νi, νit) p(ε
P
i, ε
E
i, νi) p(νit) dε
P
i dε
E
i dνi dνit 
The simulation of this part of the likelihood is done in the same fashion as for equation (B.1). The 
only substantial difference is that we now also need to simulate the error-term νit. The simulated 
likelihood reads as: 
(B.4)  Λit
s =  (1/R)  ∑r=1,..,R P(ε
I
it >., ε
P
it<. | ε
P
ir, ε
E
ir, νir, νitr) 
where the error terms (ε
P
ir,ε
E
ir,νir) are random draws from the multivariate normal distribution, 
and νitr random draws from the univariate normal distribution. 
Finally, the likelihood contribution of a non-participating, i.e., voluntary unemployed, woman is:  
(B.5)  Λit   = P(Pit=0 ) William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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  =   ∫∫ P(ε
P
it  - γ
Pνit>. | ε
P
i, νi) p(ε
P
i, νi) dε
P
i  dνi 
where the distribution of the term (ε
P
it  - γ
Pνit>.) is straightforward due to assumption (A.3), stated 
in the Appendix A. The simulated form of the likelihood is given by: 
(B.6)  Λit
s =  (1/R)  ∑r=1,..,R P(ε
P
it  - γ
Pνit>. | ε
P
ir, νir)   . 
Again, the error terms (ε
P
ir, νir)  are random draws from the multivariate normal distribution.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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Figure 1: Female Labor Force Participation Rates in East and West Germany 
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Source: Statistics Germany (various issues), own calculations  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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Figure 2: Simulations of Female Labor Force Participation Rates 
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Explanation: The basic simulation is on the basis of own parameters and own individual characteristics, the 
preferences simulation uses the counterfactual parameters of the participation equation, and the characteristics 
simulation uses the counterfactual individual characteristics.    William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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Table 1: Sample Statistics, Married and Cohabiting Women (ages 25-44 at unification) 
West-German  Women  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(observations)  880 901 889 857 882 880 833 829 773 761
Age  34.16 35.11 35.93 36.91 37.78 38.80 39.65 40.71 41.58 42.63
Participation  0.60 0.59 0.61 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.70
Employment  0.57 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.66
Gross hourly wage  19.40  19.86  20.55 20.86 21.76  23.27  23.32 21.68  22.62  21.95
Number of children            
Between 0-2 years  0.20  0.19  0.18 0.18 0.17  0.13  0.11 0.09  0.10  0.07
Between 3-5 years  0.27  0.27  0.24 0.25 0.23  0.23  0.22 0.19  0.16  0.13
Between 6-16 years  0.71  0.74  0.80 0.82 0.84  0.84  0.84 0.81  0.80  0.78
Husbands            
Age  37.19 38.14 38.94 39.97 40.72 41.67 42.46 43.47 44.32 45.39
Employed  0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.91
Gross hourly wage  27.80  28.51  29.51 30.43 31.72  32.11  32.30 32.24  32.46  33.79
Benefit (1.000 DEM)  1.08  1.21  1.31 1.64 1.69  1.59  1.80 1.62  1.78  1.97
            
East-German  Women  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
(observations)  764 717 717 659 651 642 608 577 552 538
Age  34.08 35.05 35.89 37.17 37.91 38.99 39.87 40.98 41.81 41.81
Participation  0.88 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.90
Employment  0.88 0.79 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75
Gross hourly wage  10.54  12.20  15.67 16.96 18.45  20.33  20.17 20.28  21.04  21.03
Number of children            
Between 0-2 years  0.17  0.13  0.07 0.05 0.04  0.03  0.03 0.02  0.02  0.02
Between 3-5 years  0.27  0.23  0.23 0.18 0.14  0.10  0.06 0.06  0.04  0.04
Between 6-16 years  1.00  1.06  1.07 1.05 1.06  1.03  1.00 0.89  0.83  0.83
Husbands            
Age  36.84 37.76 38.74 39.89 40.60 41.71 42.58 43.65 44.59 44.59
Employed  0.98 0.94 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.83
Gross hourly wage  12.05  15.64  17.46 18.53 20.37  21.52  21.83 21.81  22.78  23.07
Benefit (1.000 DEM)  0.96  1.18  1.26 1.27 1.29  1.30  1.32 1.33  1.33  1.37
Note: Wages and benefits are measured in real 1991 German Marks. The wages are calculated only for the employed, while the benefits 
are calculated only for the husbands receiving a benefit. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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Table 2: Estimation Results, East-German women 
  Participation Job-offer  Ln(wage)   
  par. s.e.    par. s.e.    par. s.e.   
Individual char.                Individual  char. 
Constant  2.9631 1.8588      -0.9308 2.0324    1.4840 0.3839***  Constant 
Age  -0.1245 0.1075    0.0488 0.1075    0.0391 0.0217* Age 
Age2  0.0016 0.0015    -0.0005 0.0015    -0.0005 0.0003  Age2 
Education                 Education 
General            0.0960  0.3281  General 
General x Age              -0.0090  0.0087  General x Age 
Vocational            -0.0951  0.1254  Vocational 
Vocational x Age              0.0104  0.0035***  Vocational x Age 
University            0.1782  0.1953  University 
University x Age              0.0091  0.0054*  University x Age 
Interaction Time                 Interaction  Time 
Age x Time  -0.0096  0.0049 **  -0.0013  0.0039   -0.0002  0.0008  Age x Time 
General x Time              0.0012  0.0197  General x Time 
Vocational x Time              0.0047  0.0075  Vocational x Time 
University x Time              0.0190  0.0104*  University x Time 
Wage                 Wage 
Ln(wage)  0.8186 0.1882  ***  0.6248 0.2694  **        Ln(wage) 
Ln(wage) x Time        0.1373  0.0606 **         
Number of Children                 Year 
0-2 years  -1.8369  0.2066 ***        -0.1210  0.0399***  1990 
3-5 years  -0.4112  0.1444 ***        0.0000  0.0000  1991 
6-16 years  0.0104  0.0823         0.1955  0.0425***  1992 
Interaction Time            0.2425  0.0664***  1993 
0-2 years x Time  -0.0531  0.0510         0.3195  0.0948***  1994 
3-5 years x Time  -0.0770  0.0407 *        0.3638  0.1255***  1995 
6-16 years x Time  -0.0286  0.0191         0.3608  0.1577**  1996 
Husband           0.3620  0.1914**  1997 
Ln(wage) -0.1830  0.1196          0.3768  0.2257*  1998 
Non-employed -0.1100  0.5033          0.3685  0.2621    1999 
Ln(benefit) -0.0703  0.0572                 
Region                  
Unemployment rate        -3.5179  2.3703 *         
Vacancy rate        -1.8011  2.4475          
Year                  
Time  0.2556 0.1828    -0.4680 0.1979  **         
Time2  0.0106 0.0072    0.0237 0.0073  ***         
Note: Parameters marked with *, ** or *** are significant at a 10, 5 and 1 percent significance level, respectively.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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Table 3: Estimation Results on Variances and Covariances 
  Participation Job-offer Ln(wage) 
  par.  s.e.   par.  s.e.   par.  s.e.  
East-German women                
Standard deviations                 
Idiosyncratic errors  1.0000  0.0000   1.0000  0.0000   0.3311  0.0081 *** 
Individual errors  0.2851  0.1651 *  0.4518  0.1885 **  0.0000  0.0000  
Covariances                 
Idiosyncratic  errors      0.0000  0.0000         
Individual  errors      -0.1256  0.1018         
West-German women                 
Standard deviations                 
Idiosyncratic errors  1.0000  0.0000   1.0000  0.0000   0.4677  0.0108 *** 
Individual errors  0.2360  0.1398 *  0.3337  0.2177   0.0491  0.0670  
Covariances                 
Idiosyncratic  errors      0.0000  0.0000         
Individual  errors      0.0557  0.0726         
Note: The only identified covariances are between the participation and the job-offer equation; see Appendix A. 
The standard deviations of the idiosyncratic error terms of the participation and the job-offer equation are set equal 
to one by means of normalization. Some of the standard deviations and covariances are set equal to zero as they 
converged to zero within the maximum likelihood optimization procedure.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 477 
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Table 4: Estimation Results, West-German women 
  Participation Job-offer  Ln(wage)   
  par.  s.e.   par.  s.e.   par. s.e.    
Individual char.               Individual char. 
Constant  -1.0717  1.4652   -2.9550  3.2365    2.3529 0.5944 ***  Constant 
Age  0.1103  0.0749    0.1871  0.1037 *  0.0226 0.0299   Age 
Age2  -0.0019  0.0010 *  -0.0021  0.0019    -0.0003 0.0004   Age2 
Education                 Education 
General            -0.0069 0.2693    General 
General x Age              -0.0046 0.0066   General x Age 
Vocational            0.2163 0.3351    Vocational 
Vocational x Age              -0.0020 0.0084   Vocational x Age 
University            -0.4379 0.2974    University 
University x Age              0.0225 0.0074 ***  University x Age 
Interaction Time                 Interaction  Time 
Age x Time                    Age x Time 
General x Time                    General x Time 
Vocational x Time                    Vocational x Time 
University x Time                    University x Time 
Wage                   Wage 
Ln(wage)  0.3491  0.1609 ***  0.2000  0.5679          Ln(hourly wage) 
Ln(wage) x Time        0.0408  0.1184          
Number of Children                   Year 
0-2 years  -1.2881  0.1294 ***        -0.0027 0.0699   1990 
3-5 years  -0.6886  0.1051 ***        0.0000 0.0000   1991 
6-16 years  -0.2569  0.0620 ***        0.0296 0.0688   1992 
Interaction Time            0.0405 0.0684   1993 
0-2 years x Time  -0.0429  0.0267 *        0.0613 0.0677   1994 
3-5 years x Time  -0.0194  0.0265         0.1065 0.0666 *  1995 
6-16 years x Time  -0.0099  0.0138         0.1157 0.0694 *  1996 
Husband           0.0623 0.0712    1997 
Ln(wage)  -0.1686  0.0894 *        0.0945 0.0712    1998 
Non-employed  0.2201  0.4139         0.0571 0.0717   1999 
Ln(benefit) -0.0903  0.0427  ***               
Region                    
Unemployment rate        0.6853  4.1118          
Vacancy rate        1.3402  1.3741          
Year                    
Time  0.0295  0.0414   -0.1377  0.3381          
Time2  0.0014  0.0050   -0.0008  0.0107          
Note: Parameters marked with *, ** or *** are significant at a 10, 5 and 1 percent significance level, respectively.  
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